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Abstract—This paper simplifies an existing coding scheme
for the two-receiver discrete memoryless broadcast channel
with complementary receiver side information where there is
a passive eavesdropper and individual secrecy is required. The
existing coding scheme is simplified in two steps by replacing
Wyner secrecy coding with Carleial-Hellman secrecy coding. The
resulting simplified scheme is free from redundant message splits
and random components. Not least, the simplified scheme retains
the existing achievable individual secrecy rate region. Finally, its
construction simplicity helps us gain additional insight on the
integration of secrecy techniques into error-correcting coding
schemes.
Index Terms—Broadcast channel, individual secrecy, physical
layer security, receiver side information.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background
The open nature of wireless communication channels
makes transmitted signals susceptible to passive eavesdrop-
pers present in the communication range. As a result, the
problem of secure communication channel has always been of
utmost priority. As such, various security techniques have been
developed for application at different layers of the protocol
stack such as cryptography and fequency hopping. Recently,
information theoretic secrecy has gained more attention since
it has significant advantages by not considering assumptions
of limited computational power of the eavesdropper.
Information theoretic secrecy in the presence of eavesdrop-
pers was first applied in point-to-point communication systems
and the earliest study dates back to Shannon’s paper in 1949
[1]. In the paper, Shannon proposed a secure communication
strategy by having the transmitter and legitimate receiver share
a secret key, which is unknown to the eavesdropper. This secret
key approach (also known as one-time pad) which achieves
perfect secrecy, i.e., zero information leakage, however, re-
quires the secret key to be at least the size of the message and
be independent of the message.
The statistical difference in channel noise has also been
exploited as a means to ensure information theoretic secrecy.
This is demonstrated by Wyner who introduced the wiretap
channel in which the signal transmitted by a sender is re-
ceived by a legitimate receiver and an eavesdropper via noisy
channels [2]. The wiretap coding scheme invovles multicoding
and randomized encoding. The principle behind this coding
scheme is to provide sufficient randomness to the codeword in
order to protect the message from the eavesdropper. However,
secret communication is viable through this scheme if the
channel to the eavesdropper is weaker than the channel to
the legitimate receiver.
The common approaches of information theoretic secrecy
discussed above were even applied in broadcast channels.
Schaefer and Khisti implemented the usage of secret keys
to securely transmit a common message to two legitimate
receivers while keeping the message ignorant from an eaves-
dropper [3]. On the other hand, Csisza´r and Ko¨rner [4] as
well as Chia and El Gamal [5] extended Wyner wiretap
coding to the general discrete memoryless broadcast channels.
The cases in [4], [5] study broadcast channels with different
number of receivers but both involve securing a single private
message. A combinational approach was even demonstrated
by Chen, Koyluoglu and Sezgin [6] in which both the one-
time pad approach and Wyner serecy coding are combined
into the superposition-Marton coding scheme [7], [8] to ensure
secure broadcasting in the case of the two-receiver discrete
memoryless broadcast channel with complementary receiver
side information and with a passive eavesdropper.
Over the course of the aforementioned studies, there is no
single unified strategy while integrating secrecy techniques
into existing error-correcting coding schemes (without secrecy
constraints) to ensure information theoretic secrecy. This moti-
vates us to investigate if there exists a more intuitive guide on
applying secrecy techniques to existing error-correcting coding
schemes when secrecy is concerned. To achieve this goal,
we continue from the study of Chen et al. [6] which focus
on the two-receiver discrete memoryless broadcast channel
with complementary receiver side information and with an
eavesdropper under individual secrecy constraints. Our choice
of study follows upon the fact that Chen-Koyluoglu-Sezgin
secrecy coding scheme is more comprehensive since it com-
bines two secrecy techniques into the popular superposition-
Marton error-correcting coding scheme. In short, this paper
aims to obtain an intuitive understanding on the integration
of individual secrecy techniques to existing channel coding
schemes.
B. Contributions
We notice that Carleial-Hellman secrecy coding [9], which
allows each message to act as a random component in ensuring
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Fig. 1. The two-receiver broadcast channel with an eavesdropper.
the individual secrecy of each another, can be used to simplify
the stucture of Chen-Koyluoglu-Sezgin secrecy coding scheme
for the two-receiver discrete memoryless broadcast channel
with complementary receiver side information and with a
passive eavesdropper. This leads us to perform a two-step
scheme simplification which involves the gradual replacement
of Wyner secrecy coding with Carleial-Hellman secrecy cod-
ing. The final simplified coding scheme essentially allows us
to identify the redundant components in the existing coding
scheme. Although the proposed simplified coding scheme is
shown to achieve the same rate region as the existing coding
scheme, its construction simplicity provides a clear view on the
integration of secrecy techniques into existing error-correcting
coding schemes and enriches our present understanding on
coding principles for individual secrecy. This understanding
also acts as a basis while devising a coding scheme for
secure broadcasting in the two-receiver discrete memoryless
broadcast channel with one-sided receiver side information in
our parallel work [10].
C. Paper Organization
The entire paper will be organized as follows. Section II
will focus on the system model. Section III will provide
an overview of the related works that motivate this paper.
Section IV will provide the main results on the coding scheme
simplification. Lastly, section V will provide a brief discussion
and conclude the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this paper, we will denote random variables by up-
percase letters, their corresponding realizations by lowercase
letters and their corresponding sets by calligraphic letters. A
(j − i+ 1)-sequence of random variables will be denoted by
Xji = (Xi, . . . , Xj) for 1 ≤ i ≤ j. Whenever i = 1, the
subscript will be dropped, resulting in Xj = (X1, . . . , Xj).
Rd represents the d-dimensional real Euclidean space and
Rd+ represents the d-dimensional non-negative real Euclidean
space. R will be used to represent a subset of Rd, and the
convex hull of R will be denoted as co(R). Meanwhile, [a : b]
refers to a set of natural numbers between and including a
and b, for a ≤ b. Lastly, the operator × denotes the Cartesian
product.
The focus of this paper will be on the scheme simpli-
fication for the two-receiver discrete memoryless broadcast
channel with complementary receiver side information and
with a passive eavesdropper (hereafter referred as the broadcast
channel with complementary side information). The system
model for this case is illustrated in Fig. 1. In this model, we
define (M1,M2) as the source messages, Mi as the message
requested by legitimate receiver i and Mıˆ, ıˆ , (i mod 2) + 1
as the message known a priori (i.e., receiver side information),
for all i ∈ {1, 2}. Let X denote the channel input from the
sender, while Yi and Z denote the channel output to receiver
i and the eavesdropper respectively. In n channel uses, Xn
represents the transmitted codeword, Y ni represents the signal
received by legitimate receiver i and Zn represents the signal
received by the eavesdropper. The memoryless (and without
feedback) nature of the channel also implies that
p(yn1 , y
n
2 , z
n|xn) =
n∏
i=1
p(y1i, y2i, zi|xi) (1)
In this case, the transmitter will be sending messages M1
and M2 to legitimate receiver 1 and 2, respectively through
the channel p(y1, y2, z|x). Both legitimate receivers have com-
plementary receiver side information to aid them in decoding
the transmitted messages. In other words, receiver 1 will be
having M2 as side information, whereas receiver 2 will be
having M1 as side information.
Definition 1: A (2nR1 , 2nR2 , n) secrecy code for the two-
receiver discrete memoryless broadcast channel with comple-
mentary side information consists of
• two message sets, where M1 = [1 : 2nR1 ] and M2 =
[1 : 2nR2 ];
• an encoding function, f : M1 ×M2 → Xn, such that
Xn = f(M1,M2); and
• two decoding functions, gi : Yni × Mıˆ → Mi, such
that Mˆi = gi(Y ni ,Mıˆ), where ıˆ , (i mod 2) + 1, for all
i ∈ {1, 2}.
Both messages, M1 and M2 are assumed to be uniformly
distributed over their respective message set. Hence, we have
Ri =
1
nH(Mi), for all i ∈ {1, 2}. Meanwhile the individual
information leakage rate associated with the (2nR1 , 2nR2 , n)
secrecy code is defined as R(n)L,i =
1
nI(Mi;Z
n), for all i ∈
{1, 2}.
The probability of error for the secrecy code at each receiver
i is defined as P (n)e,i = P{Mˆi 6= Mi}, for i ∈ {1, 2}. A rate
pair (R1, R2) is said to be achievable if there exist a sequence
of (2nR1 , 2nR2 , n) codes such that
P
(n)
e,i ≤ n, for all i ∈ {1, 2} (2)
R
(n)
L,i ≤ τn, for all i ∈ {1, 2} (3)
lim
n→∞ n = 0 and limn→∞ τn = 0 (4)
III. RELATED WORKS
The problem in this paper is motivated by the discussions of
Chen et al. [6]. Chen et al. proposed a coding scheme for the
broadcast channel with complementary side information under
the context of individual secrecy. As illustrated in Fig. 2a,
this coding scheme involves splitting Mi, for all i ∈ {1, 2},
into four independent message segments, namely Mia at rate
Ra, Mib at rate Rb, Mic at rate Ric and Mid at rate Rid,
i.e., Mi = (Mia,Mib,Mic,Mid) where Mia ∈ [1 : 2nRa ],
Mib ∈ [1 : 2nRb ], Mic ∈ [1 : 2nRic ], Mid ∈ [1 : 2nRid ]
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{
{
{ {
{ {M2b M2c M2d
nRb
nRb
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M1 :
M2 :
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{
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D2 L2 {
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{ {M1c
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Fig. 2. An existing coding scheme for the two-receiver broadcast channel with complementary receiver side information and with an eavesdropper.
and Ri = Ra + Rb + Ric + Rid. These message segments
then make up the coding scheme in Fig. 2b which comprises
of four layers: cloud center codeword Un, common satellite
codeword V n as well as private satellite codewords V n1 and
V n2 .
In this scheme, the cloud center codeword Un comprises
a one-time pad signal [1]. This secret key M1a ⊕ M2a is
formed by XOR-ing the first segment of each message. The
utilization of a one-time pad signal is possible since the
legitimate receivers can utilize their receiver side information
to unveil the original message.
A main contribution in the coding scheme proposed by Chen
et al. [6] is a common satellite codeword V n formed and
combined with Un using superposition coding [7]. In the V n
codeword layer, Wyner secrecy coding [2] is implemented to
protect the message segments M1c and M2c using a randomly
generated D. However, apart from the regular randomness
D, the authors presented an interesting idea of providing
additional randomness through another one time-pad signal
M1b ⊕M2b.
Meanwhile, the private satellite codewords V n1 and V
n
2 ,
which are responsible of carrying the remaining message
segments M1d and M2d to their respective legitimate receivers,
are also secured with Wyner secrecy coding [2] using ran-
domly generated D1 and D2 respectively. The private satellite
codewords V n1 and V
n
2 are first combined under Marton coding
in which the components L1 and L2 are present to ensure the
existence of at least one jointly typical sequence pair between
V n1 and V
n
2 [8]. Next, the V
n
1 and V
n
2 codeword layers are
combined with the upper Un and V n codeword layers using
superposition coding, forming a superposition-Marton coding
framework to achieve an improved rate region. This coding
scheme has the achievability conditions listed in Theorem 1.
After the Fourier-Motzkin procedure [7, Appendix D], the
achievable individual secrecy rate region Rold is obtained as
in Corollary 1.
Theorem 1 (Chen et al. [6]): The following individual
secrecy rate region is achievable for the two-receiver discrete
memoryless broadcast channel with complementary receiver
side information and with a passive eavesdropper:
(R1, R2)
∈ R2+
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
R1 = Ra +Rb +R1c +R1d,
R2 = Ra +Rb +R2c +R2d,
RL1 +RL2 > I(V1;V2|V ),
R1 +RD +RD1 +RL1 < I(U, V, V1;Y1),
R1 −Ra +RD +RD1 +RL1 < I(V, V1;Y1|U),
R1d +RD1 +RL1 < I(V1;Y1|V ),
R2 +RD +RD2 +RL2 < I(U, V, V2;Y2),
R2 −Ra +RD +RD2 +RL2 < I(V, V2;Y2|U),
R2d +RD2 +RL2 < I(V2;Y2|V ),
RD1 +RL1 ≥ I(V1;Z|V ),
RD2 +RL2 ≥ I(V2;Z|V ),
Rb +RD
(a)
≥ I(V ;Z|U),
RL1 +RL2 ≤ I(V1;Z|V ) + I(V2;Z|V )
− I(V1, V2;Z|V ),
R1 ≥ 0, Ra ≥ 0, Rb ≥ 0, R1c ≥ 0,
R1d ≥ 0, R2 ≥ 0, R2c ≥ 0, R2d ≥ 0,
RD ≥ 0, RD1 ≥ 0, RD2 ≥ 0, RL1 ≥ 0, RL2 ≥ 0
over all p(u)p(v|u)p(v1, v2|v)p(x|v1, v2)

(5)
Corollary 1 ( [6, Theorem 9]): The achievable individual
secrecy rate region in Theorem 1 can be written as follows:
Rold ,

(R1, R2)
∈ R2+
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
R1 < I(U ;Y1) + I(V, V1;Y1|U)
− I(V, V1;Z|U) + I(V ;Z|U),
R1 −R2 < I(V, V1;Y1|U)− I(V, V1;Z|U),
R2 < I(U ;Y2) + I(V, V2;Y2|U)
− I(V, V2;Z|U) + I(V ;Z|U),
R2 −R1 < I(V, V2;Y2|U)− I(V, V2;Z|U)
over all p(u)p(v|u)p(v1, v2|v)p(x|v1, v2)
subject to I(V1;V2|V )
(a)
< I(V1;Z|V )
+ I(V2;Z|V )− I(V1, V2;Z|V ),
I(V, Vi;Yi|U)
(b)
> I(V, Vi;Z|U) and
I(Vi;Yi|V )
(c)
> I(Vi;Z|V ), for all i ∈ {1, 2}.

(6)
M1a M1c M1d
{
{
{ {
{ {M2a M2c M2d
nRa
nRa
nR1c nR1d
nR2c nR2d
M1 :
M2 :
(a) Rate splitting
M1d
{
{ {M2d
nR1d
nR2d nRD2
V n1 (Ma,M1c,M2c, D,M1d, D1, L1)|V n(Ma,M1c,M2c,D) :
V n2 (Ma,M1c,M2c, D,M2d, D2, L2)|V n(Ma,M1c,M2c,D) :
M1a ⊕M2a
{ nRa
Un(Ma) :
D1
{nRD1
L1
{nRL1
D2 L2 {
nRL2
{M1c
nR1c
V n(Ma,M1c,M2c, D)|Un(Ma) : M2c D{
nR2c
{
nRD
(b) Encoding
Fig. 3. Simplified coding scheme 1.
Note that for the superscript of R, we use the shorthand
notation ’old’ to denote an existing region and ’new’ to denote
a new region. We will also use (xx.yy) to denote the yy
constraint in equation xx.
IV. PROPOSED SIMPLIFICATION FOR THE TWO-RECEIVER
BROADCAST CHANNEL WITH COMPLEMENTARY SIDE
INFORMATION
The coding scheme simplification for the two-receiver
broadcast channel with complementary side information was
carried out in two steps.
A. Simplification Step 1
For the first simplification step, we performed rate splitting
to break Mi, for all i ∈ {1, 2}, into three indepedent message
segments as shown in Fig. 3a. Compared to rate splitting for
the existing coding scheme in Fig. 2a, our approach requires
one less message split for Mi, i.e., Mib = φ. In line with
the existing coding scheme, our proposed simplified coding
scheme 1 is then constructed from a combination of a one-
time pad signal [1], superposition coding [7], Wyner secrecy
coding [2] and Marton coding [8] as illustrated in Fig. 3b.
Our simplified coding scheme 1 differs from the exist-
ing coding scheme [6] in Fig. 2 as we bring in Carleial-
Hellman secrecy coding [9] to partially replace Wyner secrecy
coding [2] in the common satellite codeword V n. Through
this approach, the message segments M1c and M2c are now
responsible of ensuring the individual secrecy of each another
with the aid of an additional randomness D.
The partial replacement of Wyner secrecy coding [2] with
Carleial-Hellman secrecy coding [9] changes the individual
secrecy analysis. Hence, it is insufficient to directly set Rb = 0
in order to reflect Mib = φ. A modified decoding strategy is
required, resulting in Lemma 1. Using Rold’ in Lemma 1, we
then obtain the achievable individual secrecy rate region of the
simplified coding scheme 1 as presented in Theorem 2.
Lemma 1: The existing coding scheme by Chen et al. [6] for
the two-receiver discrete memoryless broadcast channel with
complementary receiver side information and with a passive
eavesdropper also achieves an alternative individual secrecy
rate region Rold’ as stated below:
(R1, R2)
∈ R2+
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
R1 = Ra +Rb +R1c +R1d,
R2 = Ra +Rb +R2c +R2d,
RL1 +RL2 > I(V1;V2|V ),
R1 +RD +RD1 +RL1 < I(U, V, V1;Y1),
R1 −Ra +RD +RD1 +RL1 < I(V, V1;Y1|U),
R1d +RD1 +RL1 < I(V1;Y1|V ),
R2 +RD +RD2 +RL2 < I(U, V, V2;Y2),
R2 −Ra +RD +RD2 +RL2 < I(V, V2;Y2|U),
R2d +RD2 +RL2 < I(V2;Y2|V ),
RD1 +RL1 ≥ I(V1;Z|V ),
RD2 +RL2 ≥ I(V2;Z|V ),
Rb +R1c +RD
(a)
≥ I(V ;Z|U),
Rb +R2c +RD
(b)
≥ I(V ;Z|U),
RL1 +RL2 ≤ I(V1;Z|V ) + I(V2;Z|V )
− I(V1, V2;Z|V ),
R1 ≥ 0, Ra ≥ 0, Rb ≥ 0, R1c ≥ 0,
R1d ≥ 0, R2 ≥ 0, R2c ≥ 0, R2d ≥ 0,
RD ≥ 0, RD1 ≥ 0, RD2 ≥ 0, RL1 ≥ 0, RL2 ≥ 0
over all p(u)p(v|u)p(v1, v2|v)p(x|v1, v2)

(7)
and Rold’ = Rold.
Proof of Lemma 1: The achievability conditions of Rold’
are obtained based on the existing coding scheme for the two-
receiver broadcast channel with complementary receiver side
information [6]. However, the achievability conditions of Rold’
differ slightly from the achievability conditions of Rold in
Theorem 1, where constraints (7.a) and (7.b) have replaced
constraint (5.a). This is a result of a difference in individual
secrecy analysis for the V n codewords. In Theorem 1, both
the message segments M1c and M2c are secured by the XOR-
ed message segments M1b ⊕M2b and additional randomness
D. Meanwhile, in Lemma 1, we apply the concept of Carleial-
Hellman secrecy coding and treat the respective message
segments M1c or M2c as additional randomness in ensuring
the individual secrecy of their counterparts. This approach
results in the looser constraints (7.a) and (7.b). Although Rold
seems to have stricter achievability conditions compared to
Rold’, we now show that the two regions are in fact the same.
Applying the Fourier-Motzkin procedure to eliminate the
terms Ra, Rb, R1c, R1d, R2c, R2d, RD, RD1, RD2, RL1 and
RL2 in (7), we obtain the individual secrecy rate region Rold’,
which has the same rate region expression as Rold in (6). This
gives us the relationship Rold’ = Rold.
Using the alternative expression in (7), we will prove the
following theorem.
Theorem 2: The simplified coding scheme 1 for the two-
receiver discrete memoryless broadcast channel with comple-
mentary receiver side information and with a passive eaves-
dropper achieves an individual secrecy rate region Rnew1,
where Rnew1 = Rold.
Proof of Theorem 2: The proposed simplified coding
scheme 1 in Fig. 3b can be readily obtained from the existing
coding scheme by Chen et al. [6] in Fig. 2b by setting
Mib = φ, for all i ∈ {1, 2} in the existing coding scheme. With
this change, Rb = 0, allowing us to rewrite the achievability
conditions in (7) as follows:
(R1, R2)
∈ R2+
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
R1 = Ra +R1c +R1d,
R2 = Ra +R2c +R2d,
RL1 +RL2 > I(V1;V2|V ),
R1 +RD +RD1 +RL1 < I(U, V, V1;Y1),
R1 −Ra +RD +RD1 +RL1 < I(V, V1;Y1|U),
R1d +RD1 +RL1 < I(V1;Y1|V ),
R2 +RD +RD2 +RL2 < I(U, V, V2;Y2),
R2 −Ra +RD +RD2 +RL2 < I(V, V2;Y2|U),
R2d +RD2 +RL2 < I(V2;Y2|V ),
RD1 +RL1 ≥ I(V1;Z|V ),
RD2 +RL2 ≥ I(V2;Z|V ),
R1c +RD ≥ I(V ;Z|U),
R2c +RD ≥ I(V ;Z|U),
RL1 +RL2 ≤ I(V1;Z|V ) + I(V2;Z|V )
− I(V1, V2;Z|V ),
R1 ≥ 0, Ra ≥ 0, R1c ≥ 0, R1d ≥ 0,
R2 ≥ 0, R2c ≥ 0, R2d ≥ 0, RD ≥ 0,
RD1 ≥ 0, RD2 ≥ 0, RL1 ≥ 0, RL2 ≥ 0
over all p(u)p(v|u)p(v1, v2|v)p(x|v1, v2)

(8)
Applying the Fourier-Motzkin procedure to eliminate the terms
Ra, R1c, R1d, R2c, R2d, RD, RD1, RD2, RL1 and RL2 in
(8), we obtain Rold.
B. Simplification Step 2
Referring to the common satellite codeword V n of sim-
plified coding scheme 1 in Fig. 3b, we recall that Carleial-
Hellman secrecy coding [9] allows each message to act as a
random component which ensures individual secrecy of each
another. Intuitively, additional random component should not
be necessary in securing messages since each message has
M1d
{
{ {M2d
nR1d
nR2d nRD2
V n1 (Ma,M1c,M2c,M1d, D1, L1)|V n(Ma,M1c,M2c) :
V n2 (Ma,M1c,M2c,M2d, D2, L2)|V n(Ma,M1c,M2c) :
M1a ⊕M2a
{ nRa
Un(Ma) :
D1
{nRD1
L1
{nRL1
D2 L2 {
nRL2
{M1c
nR1c
V n(Ma,M1c,M2c)|Un(Ma) : M2c{
nR2c
Fig. 4. Simplified coding scheme 2.
provided sufficient randomness. With this concept in mind,
we proceed with the removal of the randomness D from the
V n codeword of the previous simplified coding scheme 1.
The simplified coding scheme 2 is illustrated in Fig. 4. The
achievable individual secrecy rate region of this simplified
coding scheme 2 is shown in Theorem 3 and rate region
comparison is done through the proofs for Theorem 4 and
Theorem 5 below.
Theorem 3: Define
Rnew20 ,

(R1, R2)
∈ R2+
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
R1
(a)
> I(V ;Z|U),
R1
(b)
< I(U ;Y1) + I(V, V1;Y1|U)
− I(V, V1;Z|U) + I(V ;Z|U),
R1 −R2
(c)
< I(V, V1;Y1|U)
− I(V, V1;Z|U),
R2
(d)
> I(V ;Z|U),
R2
(e)
< I(U ;Y2) + I(V, V2;Y2|U)
− I(V, V2;Z|U) + I(V ;Z|U),
R2 −R1
(f)
< I(V, V2;Y2|U)
− I(V, V2;Z|U)
over all p(u)p(v|u)p(v1, v2|v)
p(x|v1, v2) subject to I(V1;V2|V )
(g)
<
I(V1;Z|V ) + I(V2;Z|V )
− I(V1, V2;Z|V ), I(V, Vi;Yi|U)
(h)
>
I(V, Vi;Z|U) and I(Vi;Yi|V )
(i)
>
I(Vi;Z|V ), for all i ∈ {1, 2}.

(9)
and
Rnew2i , Rnew20 without constraints (9.a), (9.d) and (9.g)–(9.i)
but with an additional constraint Vi = V = U ,
for i ∈ {1, 2}.
(10)
The simplified coding scheme 2 for the two-receiver discrete
memoryless broadcast channel with complementary receiver
side information and with a passive eavesdropper achieves an
individual secrecy rate region Rnew2, where
Rnew2 = Rnew20 ∪Rnew21 ∪Rnew22 . (11)
Remark: By comparing Rold in (6) and Rnew20 in (9), we notice
that the latter region is bounded away from the R1 and R2
axes. The origin (0, 0) in particular is not in (9) but is in (6).
This results from the usage of Carleial-Hellman secrecy coding
in the V n common satellite codeword for our proposed simpli-
fied coding scheme 2. The principle behind Carleial-Hellman
secrecy coding is to let neighbouring message segments act
as random components which ensure the individual secrecy
of each another. In order to do so, each message segment
should reach a certain threshold in randomness to keep the
eavesdropper totally ignorant of each message segment. In
our case, each of the M1c and M2c message segments has a
minimum threshold of nI(V ;Z|U) bits to fulfill the role as a
random component. This results in constraints (9.a) and (9.d),
which bound Rnew20 away from the R1 and R2 axes. However,
the points along the R1 and R2 axes can be retrieved from
Rnew21 and Rnew22 . Both Rnew21 and Rnew22 are achievable from
a reduced version of the proposed simplified coding scheme
2 as shown in the following proof.
Proof of Theorem 3: The proposed simplified coding
scheme 2 is a special case of the proposed simplified coding
scheme 1 by setting D = φ. Setting D = φ forces the rate
RD = 0, hence, we rewrite the achievable individual secrecy
rate region in (8) as
(R1, R2)
∈ R2+
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
R1 = Ra +R1c +R1d,
R2 = Ra +R2c +R2d,
RL1 +RL2
(a)
> I(V1;V2|V ),
R1 +RD1 +RL1 < I(U, V, V1;Y1),
R1 −Ra +RD1 +RL1
(b)
< I(V, V1;Y1|U),
R1d +RD1 +RL1
(c)
< I(V1;Y1|V ),
R2 +RD2 +RL2 < I(U, V, V2;Y2),
R2 −Ra +RD2 +RL2
(d)
< I(V, V2;Y2|U),
R2d +RD2 +RL2
(e)
< I(V2;Y2|V ),
RD1 +RL1
(f)
≥ I(V1;Z|V ),
RD2 +RL2
(g)
≥ I(V2;Z|V ),
R1c
(h)
≥ I(V ;Z|U),
R2c
(i)
≥ I(V ;Z|U),
RL1 +RL2
(j)
≤ I(V1;Z|V ) + I(V2;Z|V )
− I(V1, V2;Z|V ),
R1 ≥ 0, Ra ≥ 0, R1c ≥ 0, R1d ≥ 0,
R2 ≥ 0, R2c ≥ 0, R2d ≥ 0, RD1 ≥ 0,
RD2 ≥ 0, RL1 ≥ 0, RL2 ≥ 0
over all p(u)p(v|u)p(v1, v2|v)p(x|v1, v2)

(12)
Applying the Fourier-Motzkin procedure to eliminate the terms
Ra, R1c, R1d, R2c, R2d, RD1, RD2, RL1 and RL2 in (12),
the region Rnew20 is obtained.
Note that when Vi = V = U , i ∈ {1, 2}, the proposed
scheme reduces to a superposition coding scheme in which
only the Un cloud center codeword and one V ni private
satellite codeword need to be decoded. The following changes
to the simplified coding scheme 2 in Fig. 4 ensue from the
reduction:
• No new message segments are encoded to the V n code-
word, i.e., M1c = φ and M2c = φ,
• No new message segments are encoded to the reduced
V ni codeword, i.e., Mid = φ and Di = φ,
• Components of Marton coding are removed, i.e., Li = φ,
for all i ∈ {1, 2}.
These changes affect (12) by
• Removing the rate terms R1c, R2c, Rid, RDi, RL1
and RL2 (together with their respective non-negativity
constraints),
• Removing achievability constraints of the V n codeword,
i.e., both (12.b) and (12.d),
• Removing achievability constraints of the reduced V ni
codeword, i.e., (12.c) if i = 1 and (12.e) if i = 2,
• Removing individual secrecy constraints of the V n code-
word, i.e., both (12.h) and (12.i),
• Removing individual secrecy constraints of the reduced
V ni codeword, i.e., (12.f) if i = 1 and (12.g) if i = 2,
• Removing constraints due to Marton coding, i.e., both
(12.a) and (12.j).
Substituting Vi = V = U in the mutual information terms of
(12), we get
(R1, R2)
∈ R2+
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Rıˆ = Ra +Rıˆd,
Ri = Ra,
Rıˆ +RDıˆ < I(U, Vıˆ;Yıˆ),
Rıˆd +RDıˆ < I(Vıˆ;Yıˆ|U),
Ri < I(U ;Yi),
RDıˆ ≥ I(Vıˆ;Z|U),
Rıˆ ≥ 0, Ra ≥ 0, Rıˆd ≥ 0, Ri ≥ 0, RDıˆ ≥ 0,
over all p(u)p(vıˆ|u)p(x|vıˆ, u)
where ıˆ , (i mod 2) + 1, for i ∈ {1, 2}

(13)
By applying the Fourier-Motzkin procedure to eliminate the
terms Ra, Rıˆd and RDıˆ in (13), we get (9) with constraints
(9.a), (9.d) and (9.g)–(9.i) removed, giving us the regions
Rnew2i , for i ∈ {1, 2}. Taking the union of Rnew20 , Rnew21
and Rnew22 will then give us the individual secrecy rate region
Rnew2 in Theorem 3.
Theorem 4: co(Rnew2) = Rnew1.
Proof of Theorem 4: Now, we show that by taking the
convex hull of the union of Rnew20 , Rnew21 and Rnew22 , we will
be able to achieve the region Rnew1. As a start, we plot the rate
region Rnew1 as illustrated in Fig. 5a. It can be observed that
Rnew20 has two additional constraints (9.a) and (9.d) compared
R2
R1
s1s2
s3
s4
(a) Rold
R2
R1
s1s2
s3
s4
s5
s6
T1
(b) Rnew20 ,
I(V ;Z|U) ≤
I(V, Vi;Yi|U)− I(V, Vi;Z|U),
for all i ∈ {1, 2}
R2
R1
s1s2
s3
s4
s5
s6
T2
(c) Rnew20 ,
I(V ;Z|U) >
I(V, Vi;Yi|U)− I(V, Vi;Z|U),
for all i ∈ {1, 2}
R2
R1
s1s2
s3
s4
s5
s6
T3
(d) Rnew20 ,
I(V ;Z|U) >
I(V, V1;Y1|U)− I(V, V1;Z|U),
I(V ;Z|U) ≤
I(V, V2;Y2|U)− I(V, V2;Z|U)
R2
R1
s1s2
s3
s4
s5
s6
T4
(e) Rnew20 ,
I(V ;Z|U) ≤
I(V, V1;Y1|U)− I(V, V1;Z|U),
I(V ;Z|U) >
I(V, V2;Y2|U)− I(V, V2;Z|U)
Fig. 5. Plots of individual secrecy rate regions Rnew1 = Rold and Rnew20 (shaded region) for some chosen p(u)p(v|u)p(v1, v2|v)p(x|v1, v2).
to Rnew1. By comparing RHS of (9.a) and (9.d) to RHS of
(9.c) and (9.f), Rnew20 can be plotted for four cases as shown
in Fig. 5b to Fig. 5e. For all plots in Fig. 5, we have labelled
s1 = (A− ε, 0), s2 = (B − ε, 0), s3 = (0, C − ε),
s4 = (0, D − ε), s5 = (E − ε, 0), s6 = (0, E − ε)
where
A , I(U ;Y1) + I(V, V1;Y1|U)− I(V, V1;Z|U) + I(V ;Z|U),
B , I(V, V1;Y1|U)− I(V, V1;Z|U),
C , I(U ;Y2) + I(V, V2;Y2|U)− I(V, V2;Z|U) + I(V ;Z|U),
D , I(V, V2;Y2|U)− I(V, V2;Z|U),
E , I(V ;Z|U)
for some arbitrarily small ε, ε > 0. Note that E ≤ A and
E ≤ C at all times. The proof of E ≤ A is as follows:
A = I(U ;Y1) + I(V, V1;Y1|U)− I(V, V1;Z|U) + I(V ;Z|U)
(a)
≥ I(U ;Y1) + I(V ;Z|U)
≥ I(V ;Z|U)
= E
where (a) follows from (6.b) and (9.h). The same proof applies
to E ≤ C.
Referring to Fig. 5b, when I(V ;Z|U) ≤
I(V, Vi;Yi|U) − I(V, Vi;Z|U), for all i ∈ {1, 2},
the additional constraints (9.a) and (9.d) result in the
excluded square region T1. Meanwhile, in Fig. 5c, when
I(V ;Z|U) > I(V, Vi;Yi|U) − I(V, Vi;Z|U), for all
i ∈ {1, 2}, (9.a) and (9.d) form a hexagonal cut and result
in the excluded region T2. On the other hand, for the
remaining cases in Fig. 5d and Fig. 5e, (9.a) and (9.d)
form a pentagonal cut and result in the excluded regions T3
and T4 respectively. In order to retrieve the excluded rate
points in regions T1 to T4, it is essential to recover point
s2 and point s4. To recover point s2, we first consider the
random variables (U, V, V1) that are arbitrarily correlated.
Next, from Rnew22 in (10), we set V ′2 = V ′ = U ′ = U and
V ′1 = (V, V1) such that (U
′, V ′, V ′1 , V
′
1 , V
′
2 , X, Y1, Y2, Z)
satisfy p(u′)p(v′|u′)p(v′1, v′2|v′)p(x|v′1, v′2)p(y1, y2, z|x) and
the constraint V ′2 = V
′ = U ′. The substitutions are as follows:
From (9.b),
R1 <I(U
′;Y1) + I(V ′, V ′1 ;Y1|U ′)− I(V ′, V ′1 ;Z|U ′)
+ I(V ′;Z|U ′)
=I(U ;Y1) + I(U, V, V1;Y1|U)− I(U, V, V1;Z|U)
+ I(U ;Z|U)
=I(U ;Y1) + I(V, V1;Y1|U)− I(V, V1;Z|U)
From (9.c),
R1 −R2 <I(V ′, V ′1 ;Y1|U ′)− I(V ′, V ′1 ;Z|U ′)
=I(U, V, V1;Y1|U)− I(U, V, V1;Z|U)
=I(V, V1;Y1|U)− I(V, V1;Z|U)
From (9.e),
R2 <I(U
′;Y2) + I(V ′, V ′2 ;Y2|U ′)− I(V ′, V ′2 ;Z|U ′)
+ I(V ′;Z|U ′)
=I(U ;Y2) + I(U ;Y2|U)− I(U ;Z|U) + I(U ;Z|U)
=I(U ;Y2)
From (9.f),
R2 −R1 <I(V ′, V ′2 ;Y2|U ′)− I(V ′, V ′2 ;Z|U ′)
=I(U ;Y2|U)− I(U ;Z|U)
And hence,
R2 <R1
Note that we have been using constraints from (9) for the
substitutions since (10) is expressed in terms of (9). This series
of substitutions allows us to obtain a subregion Rnew2’2 :
Rnew2’2 ,

(R1, R2)
∈ R2+
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
R1
(a)
< I(U ;Y1) + I(V, V1;Y1|U)
− I(V, V1;Z|U),
R1 −R2
(b)
< I(V, V1;Y1|U)
− I(V, V1;Z|U),
R2
(c)
< I(U ;Y2),
R2
(d)
< R1
over all p(u, v, v1)
p(x|u, v, v1).

(14)
From (6), point s2 has the coordinates (I(V, V1;Y1|U) −
I(V, V1;Z|U) − ε, 0) for some arbitrarily small ε, ε > 0
where (U, V, V1, V2) satisfy p(u)p(v|u)p(v1, v2|v)p(x|v1, v2)
and constraints (6.a)–(6.c). From here, we observe that the
coordinates of s2 satisfies (14.a)–(14.d). This shows that s2
is recoverable and lies in Rnew22 since Rnew2’2 ⊆ Rnew22 .
Likewise, to recover point s4, we again consider the random
variables (U, V, V2) that are arbitrarily correlated. Next, from
Rnew21 in (10), we can set V ′1 = V ′ = U ′ = U and
V ′2 = (V, V2) such that (U
′, V ′, V ′1 , V
′
1 , V
′
2 , X, Y1, Y2, Z) sat-
isfy p(u′)p(v′|u′)p(v′1, v′2|v′)p(x|v′1, v′2)p(y1, y2, z|x) and the
constraint V ′1 = V
′ = U ′. These arguments show that
s2 ∈ Rnew22 and s4 ∈ Rnew21 . Noting that the point (0, 0) ∈
Rnew2i , for all i ∈ {1, 2}, hence, by time-sharing, we take
co(Rnew20 ∪Rnew21 ∪Rnew22 ) to achieve Rnew1.
Theorem 5: co(Rnew2) = Rnew2.
Proof of Theorem 5:
In the proof for Theorem 4, we show that through time-
sharing, we take co(Rnew2) to obtain Rnew1. Time-sharing,
however, is redundant, i.e., Rnew2 = Rnew1, if the following
conditions are met:
1) Rnew20 , Rnew21 and Rnew22 are convex.
2) Rnew20 contains all the interior points of Rnew1.
3) Rnew21 and Rnew22 contain all boundary points of Rnew1
that are excluded by Rnew20 .
Fulfilling all three conditions above allows us to recover all
points ofRnew1 by taking the union ofRnew20 ,Rnew21 andRnew22 ,
i.e., Rnew2.
In order to proof condition 1, we first note that the re-
gions Rnew20 , Rnew21 and Rnew22 can be convexified by intro-
ducing a time-sharing variable Q which is independent of
(U, V, V1, V2, X, Y1, Y2, Z). Alternatively, by defining U ′ =
(U,Q), V ′ = (V,Q), V ′1 = (V1, Q) and V
′
2 = (V2, Q), we
naturally include the time-sharing variable, hence, showing
that Rnew20 , Rnew21 and Rnew22 are convex.
Recalling our earlier discussion, we understand that Rnew20
is bounded away from the R1 and R2 axes due to constraints
(9.a) and (9.d). As a result, in order to fulfill condition 2, we
need to show that Rnew20 can go arbitrarily close to the R1 and
R2 axes, i.e., Rnew20 approaches the points (0, 0), s2 and s4 in
Fig. 5a.
Now, we show that Rnew20 goes arbitrarily close to the R1
axis by proving that the points (ε, ε) and (B − ε, ε) are in
Rnew20 for any arbitrarily small ε, ε > 0. Using an argument
similar to time-sharing, let Rnew20 be achievable from two sets
of random variables (Uα, Vα, V1α, V2α) and (Uβ , Vβ , V1β , V2β)
through an auxiliary random variable Q with probability mass
function p(q) given by:
p(q) =
{
γ if q = α
1− γ if q = β
where α and β are integer values taken by Q at different
instances of time-sharing and 0 < γ ≤ 1.
Considering a new set of random variables
(U∗, V ∗, V ∗1 , V
∗
2 , X
∗, Y ∗1 , Y
∗
2 , Z
∗) which satisfies some
p(u∗)p(v∗|u∗)p(v∗1 , v∗2 |v∗)p(x∗|v∗1 , v∗2)p(y∗1 , y∗2 , z∗|x∗), we
define:
• Uα = U∗, Vα = V ∗ and Viα = V ∗i , for all i ∈
{1, 2} such that (Uα, Vα, V1α, V2α) satisfy
p(uα)p(vα|uα)p(v1α, v2α|vα)p(x∗|v1α, v2α)p(y∗1 , y∗2 , z∗|x∗),
• V2β = Vβ = Uβ = U∗ and V1β =
(V ∗, V ∗1 ) such that (Uβ , Vβ , V1β , V2β) satisfy
p(uβ)p(vβ |uβ)p(v1β , v2β |vβ)p(x∗|v1β , v2β)p(y∗1 , y∗2 , z∗|x∗)
and the constraint V2β = Vβ = Uβ .
In order to incorporate the auxiliary random variable
Q into (9), we next define additional random variables
U ′ = (U,Q), V ′ = (V,Q), V ′1 = (V1, Q) and V
′
2 =
(V2, Q) such that (U ′, V ′, V ′1 , V
′
2 , X, Y1, Y2, Z) has the pmf
p(u′)p(v′|u′)p(v′1, v′2|v′)p(x|v′1, v′2)p(y1, y2, z|x) assigned as
follows:
p(u′) =p(u, q)
=p(q)p(u|q)
=
{
p(α)p(u|α) if q = α
p(β)p(u|β) if q = β
assign
=
{
γp(uα) if q = α
(1− γ)p(uβ) if q = β
p(v′|u′) =p(v, q|u, q)
=p(q)p(v|u, q)
=
{
p(α)p(v|u, α) if q = α
p(β)p(v|u, β) if q = β
assign
=
{
γp(vα|uα) if q = α
(1− γ)p(vβ |uβ) if q = β
p(v′1|v′) =p(v1, q|v, q)
=p(q)p(v1|v, q)
=
{
p(α)p(v1|v, α) if q = α
p(β)p(v1|v, β) if q = β
assign
=
{
γp(v1α|vα) if q = α
(1− γ)p(v1β |vβ) if q = β
p(v′2|v′) =p(v2, q|v, q)
=p(q)p(v2|v, q)
=
{
p(α)p(v2|v, α) if q = α
p(β)p(v2|v, β) if q = β
assign
=
{
γp(v2α|vα) if q = α
(1− γ)p(v2β |vβ) if q = β
p(x|v′1, v′2) =p(x|v1, v2, q)
=
{
p(x|v1, v2, α) if q = α
p(x|v1, v2, β) if q = β
assign
=
{
p(x∗|v1α, v2α) if q = α
p(x∗|v1β , v2β) if q = β
Substituting these properties into (9), we have:
From (9.a) and (9.d),
R1 >I(V
′;Z|U ′)
=I(V,Q;Z|U,Q)
=I(V ;Z|U,Q)
=
∑
q
p(q)I(V ;Z|U,Q = q)
=p(α)I(Vα;Z
∗|Uα) + p(β)I(Vβ ;Z∗|Uβ)
=γI(V ∗;Z∗|U∗) + (1− γ)I(U∗;Z∗|U∗)
=γI(V ∗;Z∗|U∗) (15)
R2 >I(V
′;Z|U ′)
=γI(V ∗;Z∗|U∗) (16)
From (9.b),
R1 <I(U
′;Y1) + I(V ′, V ′1 ;Y1|U ′)− I(V ′, V ′1 ;Z|U ′)
+ I(V ′;Z|U ′)
=I(U,Q;Y1) + I(V, V1, Q;Y1|U,Q)
− I(V, V1, Q;Z|U,Q) + I(V,Q;Z|U,Q)
=I(Q;Y1) + I(U ;Y1|Q) + I(V, V1;Y1|U,Q)
− I(V, V1;Z|U,Q) + I(V ;Z|U,Q)
=
∑
q
p(q)[I(U ;Y1|Q = q) + I(V, V1;Y1|U,Q = q)
− I(V, V1;Z|U,Q = q + I(V ;Z|U,Q = q)] + I(Q;Y1)
=p(α)[I(Uα;Y
∗
1 ) + I(Vα, V1α;Y
∗
1 |Uα)− I(Vα, V1α;Z∗|Uα)
+ I(Vα;Z
∗|Uα)] + p(β)[I(Uβ ;Y ∗1 ) + I(Vβ , V1β ;Y ∗1 |Uβ)
− I(Vβ , V1β ;Z∗|Uβ) + I(Vβ ;Z∗|Uβ)] + I(Q;Y1)
=γ[I(U∗;Y ∗1 ) + I(V
∗, V ∗1 ;Y
∗
1 |U∗)− I(V ∗, V ∗1 ;Z∗|U∗)
+ I(V ∗;Z∗|U∗)] + (1− γ)[I(U∗;Y ∗1 )
+ I(U∗, V ∗, V ∗1 ;Y
∗
1 |U∗)− I(U∗, V ∗, V ∗1 ;Z∗|U∗)
+ I(U∗;Z∗|U∗)] + I(Q;Y1)
=γ[I(U∗;Y ∗1 ) + I(V
∗, V ∗1 ;Y
∗
1 |U∗)− I(V ∗, V ∗1 ;Z∗|U∗)
+ I(V ∗;Z∗|U∗)] + (1− γ)[I(U∗;Y ∗1 )
+ I(V ∗, V ∗1 ;Y
∗
1 |U∗)− I(V ∗, V ∗1 ;Z∗|U∗)] + I(Q;Y1)
=I(U∗;Y ∗1 ) + I(V
∗, V ∗1 ;Y
∗
1 |U∗)− I(V ∗, V ∗1 ;Z∗|U∗)
+ γI(V ∗;Z∗|U∗) + I(Q;Y1) (17)
From (9.c),
R1 −R2 <I(V ′, V ′1 ;Y1|U ′)− I(V ′, V ′1 ;Z|U ′)
=I(V, V1, Q;Y1|U,Q)− I(V, V1, Q;Z|U,Q)
=I(V, V1;Y1|U,Q)− I(V, V1;Z|U,Q)
=
∑
q
p(q)[I(V, V1;Y1|U,Q = q)
− I(V, V1;Z|U,Q = q)]
=p(α)[I(Vα, V1α;Y
∗
1 |Uα)− I(Vα, V1α;Z∗|Uα)]
+ p(β)[I(Vβ , V1β ;Y
∗
1 |Uβ)− I(Vβ , V1β ;Z∗|Uβ)]
=γ[I(V ∗, V ∗1 ;Y
∗
1 |U∗)− I(V ∗, V ∗1 ;Z∗|U∗)]
+ (1− γ)[I(U∗, V ∗, V ∗1 ;Y ∗1 |U∗)
− I(U∗, V ∗, V ∗1 ;Z∗|U∗)]
=γ[I(V ∗, V ∗1 ;Y
∗
1 |U∗)− I(V ∗, V ∗1 ;Z∗|U∗)]
+ (1− γ)[I(V ∗, V ∗1 ;Y ∗1 |U∗)− I(V ∗, V ∗1 ;Z∗|U∗)]
=I(V ∗, V ∗1 ;Y
∗
1 |U∗)− I(V ∗, V ∗1 ;Z∗|U∗)] (18)
From (9.e),
R2 <I(U
′;Y2) + I(V ′, V ′2 ;Y2|U ′)− I(V ′, V ′2 ;Z|U ′)
+ I(V ′;Z|U ′)
=I(U,Q;Y2) + I(V, V2, Q;Y2|U,Q)
− I(V, V2, Q;Z|U,Q) + I(V,Q;Z|U,Q)
=I(Q;Y2) + I(U ;Y2|Q) + I(V, V2;Y2|U,Q)
− I(V, V2;Z|U,Q) + I(V ;Z|U,Q)
=
∑
q
p(q)[I(U ;Y2|Q = q) + I(V, V2;Y2|U,Q = q)
− I(V, V2;Z|U,Q = q) + I(V ;Z|U,Q = q)] + I(Q;Y2)
=p(α)[I(Uα;Y
∗
2 ) + I(Vα, V2α;Y
∗
2 |Uα)
− I(Vα, V2α;Z∗|Uα) + I(Vα;Z∗|Uα)]
+ p(β)[I(Uβ ;Y
∗
2 ) + I(Vβ , V2β ;Y
∗
2 |Uβ)
− I(Vβ , V2β ;Z∗|Uβ) + I(Vβ ;Z∗|Uβ)] + I(Q;Y2)
=γ[I(U∗;Y ∗2 ) + I(V
∗, V ∗2 ;Y
∗
2 |U∗)− I(V ∗, V ∗2 ;Z∗|U∗)
+ I(V ∗;Z∗|U∗)] + (1− γ)[I(U∗;Y ∗2 ) + I(U∗;Y ∗2 |U∗)
− I(U∗;Z∗|U∗) + I(U∗;Z∗|U∗)] + I(Q;Y2)
=γ[I(U∗;Y ∗2 ) + I(V
∗, V ∗2 ;Y
∗
2 |U∗)− I(V ∗, V ∗2 ;Z∗|U∗)
+ I(V ∗;Z∗|U∗)] + (1− γ)I(U∗;Y ∗2 ) + I(Q;Y2)
=I(U∗;Y ∗2 ) + γ[I(V
∗, V ∗2 ;Y
∗
2 |U∗)− I(V ∗, V ∗2 ;Z∗|U∗)
+ I(V ∗;Z∗|U∗)] + I(Q;Y2) (19)
From (9.f),
R2 −R1 <I(V ′, V ′2 ;Y2|U ′)− I(V ′, V ′2 ;Z|U ′)
=I(V, V2, Q;Y2|U,Q)− I(V, V2, Q;Z|U,Q)
=I(V, V2;Y2|U,Q)− I(V, V2;Z|U,Q)
=
∑
q
p(q)[I(V, V2;Y2|U,Q = q)
− I(V, V2;Z|U,Q = q)]
=p(α)[I(Vα, V2α;Y
∗
2 |Uα)− I(Vα, V2α;Z∗|Uα)]
+ p(β)[I(Vβ , V2β ;Y
∗
2 |Uβ)− I(Vβ , V2β ;Z∗|Uβ)]
=γ[I(V ∗, V ∗2 ;Y
∗
2 |U∗)− I(V ∗, V ∗2 ;Z∗|U∗)]
+ (1− γ)[I(U∗;Y ∗2 |U∗)− I(U∗;Z∗|U∗)]
=γ[I(V ∗, V ∗2 ;Y
∗
2 |U∗)− I(V ∗, V ∗2 ;Z∗|U∗)] (20)
From (9.g),
0 <I(V ′1 ;Z|V ′) + I(V ′2 ;Z|V ′)− I(V ′1 , V ′2 ;Z|V ′)
− I(V ′1 ;V ′2 |V ′)
=I(V1, Q;Z|V,Q) + I(V2, Q;Z|V,Q)
− I(V1, V2, Q;Z|V,Q)− I(V1, Q;V2, Q|V,Q)
=I(V1;Z|V,Q) + I(V2;Z|V,Q)− I(V1, V2;Z|V,Q)
− I(V1;V2|V,Q)
=
∑
q
p(q)[I(V1;Z|V,Q = q) + I(V2;Z|V,Q = q)
− I(V1, V2;Z|V,Q = q)− I(V1;V2|V,Q = q)]
=p(α)[I(V1α;Z
∗|Vα) + I(V2α;Z∗|Vα)− I(V1α, V2α;Z∗|Vα)
− I(V1α;V2α|Vα)] + p(β)[I(V1β ;Z∗|Vβ) + I(V2β ;Z∗|Vβ)
− I(V1β , V2β ;Z∗|Vβ)− I(V1β ;V2β |Vβ)]
=γ[I(V ∗1 ;Z
∗|V ∗) + I(V ∗2 ;Z∗|V ∗)− I(V ∗1 , V ∗2 ;Z∗|V ∗)
− I(V ∗1 ;V ∗2 |V ∗)] + (1− γ)[I(V ∗, V ∗1 ;Z∗|U∗)
+ I(U∗;Z∗|U∗)− I(V ∗, V ∗1 , U∗;Z∗|U∗)
− I(V ∗, V ∗1 ;U∗|U∗)]
=γ[I(V ∗1 ;Z
∗|V ∗) + I(V ∗2 ;Z∗|V ∗)− I(V ∗1 , V ∗2 ;Z∗|V ∗)
− I(V ∗1 ;V ∗2 |V ∗)] (21)
From (9.h),
0 <I(V ′, V ′1 ;Y1|U ′)− I(V ′, V ′1 ;Z|U ′)
=I(V, V1, Q;Y1|U,Q)− I(V, V1, Q;Z|U,Q)
=I(V, V1;Y1|U,Q)− I(V, V1;Z|U,Q)
=
∑
q
p(q)[I(V, V1;Y1|U,Q = q)− I(V, V1;Z|U,Q = q)]
=p(α)[I(Vα, V1α;Y
∗
1 |Uα)− I(Vα, V1α;Z∗|Uα)]
+ p(β)[I(Vβ , V1β ;Y
∗
1 |Uβ)− I(Vβ , V1β ;Z∗|Uβ)]
=γ[I(V ∗, V ∗1 ;Y
∗
1 |U∗)− I(V ∗, V ∗1 ;Z∗|U∗)]
+ (1− γ)[I(U∗, V ∗, V ∗1 ;Y ∗1 |U∗)− I(U∗, V ∗, V ∗1 ;Z∗|U∗)]
=γ[I(V ∗, V ∗1 ;Y
∗
1 |U∗)− I(V ∗, V ∗1 ;Z∗|U∗)]
+ (1− γ)[I(V ∗, V ∗1 ;Y ∗1 |U∗)− I(V ∗, V ∗1 ;Z∗|U∗)]
=I(V ∗, V ∗1 ;Y
∗
1 |U∗)− I(V ∗, V ∗1 ;Z∗|U∗)] (22)
0 <I(V ′, V ′2 ;Y2|U ′)− I(V ′, V ′2 ;Z|U ′)
=I(V, V2, Q;Y2|U,Q)− I(V, V2, Q;Z|U,Q)
=I(V, V2;Y2|U,Q)− I(V, V2;Z|U,Q)
=
∑
q
p(q)[I(V, V2;Y2|U,Q = q)− I(V, V2;Z|U,Q = q)]
=p(α)[I(Vα, V2α;Y
∗
2 |Uα)− I(Vα, V2α;Z∗|Uα)]
+ p(β)[I(Vβ , V2β ;Y
∗
2 |Uβ)− I(Vβ , V2β ;Z∗|Uβ)]
=γ[I(V ∗, V ∗2 ;Y
∗
2 |U∗)− I(V ∗, V ∗2 ;Z∗|U∗)]
+ (1− γ)[I(U∗;Y ∗2 |U∗)− I(U∗;Z∗|U∗)]
=γ[I(V ∗, V ∗2 ;Y
∗
2 |U∗)− I(V ∗, V ∗2 ;Z∗|U∗)] (23)
From (9.i),
0 <I(V ′1 ;Y1|V ′)− I(V ′1 ;Z|V ′)
=I(V1, Q;Y1|V,Q)− I(V1, Q;Z|V,Q)
=I(V1;Y1|V,Q)− I(V1;Z|V,Q)
=
∑
q
p(q)[I(V1;Y1|V,Q = q)− I(V1;Z|V,Q = q)]
=p(α)[I(V1α;Y
∗
1 |Vα)− I(V1α;Z∗|Vα)]
+ p(β)[I(V1β ;Y
∗
1 |Vβ)− I(V1β ;Z∗|Vβ)]
=γ[I(V ∗1 ;Y
∗
1 |V ∗)− I(V ∗1 ;Z∗|V ∗)]
+ (1− γ)[I(V ∗, V ∗1 ;Y ∗1 |U∗)− I(V ∗, V ∗1 ;Z∗|U∗)]
(24)
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Fig. 6. A secrecy technique integration strategy: Superposition-Marton coding
scheme without secrecy (left); superposition-Marton coding scheme with
secrecy (right).
0 <I(V ′2 ;Y2|V ′)− I(V ′2 ;Z|V ′)
=I(V2, Q;Y2|V,Q)− I(V2, Q;Z|V,Q)
=I(V2;Y2|V,Q)− I(V2;Z|V,Q)
=
∑
q
p(q)[I(V2;Y2|V,Q = q)− I(V2;Z|V,Q = q)]
=p(α)[I(V2α;Y
∗
2 |Vα)− I(V2α;Z∗|Vα)]
+ p(β)[I(V2β ;Y
∗
2 |Vβ)− I(V2β ;Z∗|Vβ)]
=γ[I(V ∗2 ;Y
∗
1 |V ∗)− I(V ∗2 ;Z∗|V ∗)]
+ (1− γ)[I(U∗;Y ∗1 |U∗)− I(U∗;Z∗|U∗)]
=γ[I(V ∗2 ;Y
∗
1 |V ∗)− I(V ∗2 ;Z∗|V ∗)] (25)
For any p(u∗)p(v∗|u∗)p(v∗1 , v∗2 |v∗)p(x∗|v∗1 , v∗2)p(y∗1 , y∗2 , z∗|x∗)
and any  > 0, the points (ε, ε) and (I(V ∗, V ∗1 ;Y
∗
1 |U∗) −
I(V ∗, V ∗1 ;Z
∗|U∗) − ε, ε) satisfy the constraints (15)–(25)
for some sufficiently small γ > 0. Likewise, in order to
show that the point (ε,D − ε) lies in Rnew20 , we can present
a similar argument by replacing V2β = Vβ = Uβ = U∗
and V1β = (V ∗, V ∗1 ) with V1β = Vβ = Uβ = U
∗ and
V2β = (V
∗, V ∗2 ). This proves that Rnew20 also goes arbitrarily
close to the R2 axis.
Prior to proving condition 3, we note that Rnew1 is convex
following our argument for condition 1. Recall in Theorem 4,
we have co(Rnew2) = Rnew1. We also proved condition 2
which states that Rnew20 contains all the interior points of
Rnew1. Referring to Fig. 5a, Rnew1 \ Rnew20 gives us the
boundary points of Rnew1 along the R1 and R2 axes, i.e.,
all axes points from (0, 0) to s2 as well as from (0, 0) to
s4. In the proof of Theorem 4, we have also shown that
(0, 0), s2 ∈ Rnew22 . Due to the convexity of Rnew22 , the line
segment joining (0, 0) and s2 falls in Rnew22 . Likewise, the
line segment joining (0, 0) and s4 falls in Rnew21 due to the
same argument. Hence, we obtain condition 3.
Upon proving the three conditions, we have Rnew2 =
Rnew20 ∪Rnew21 ∪Rnew22 = Rnew1 = co(Rnew2) after combining
Theorem 3 and Theorem 4.
Corollary 2: cl(Rnew20 )=cl(Rold).
Proof of Corollary 2: Corollary 2 follows from the fact
that Rnew20 contains all the interior points of Rnew1 as stated
in condition 2 for the proof of Theorem 5.
V. DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSION
For the case of the two-receiver discrete memoryless broad-
cast channel with complementary receiver side information
where there is a passive eavesdropper, our proposed scheme
simplification shows that the usage of Carleial-Hellman se-
crecy coding [9] for the common satellite codewords achieves
the same result as Wyner secrecy coding [2]. The usage
of Carleial-Hellman secrecy coding [9] drops the usage of
one-time pad signal for randomness, effectively reducing the
number of message splits. The reduction in number of message
splits simplifies the rate region computation process as the
number of messages grows with the number of receivers in
multi-receiver broadcast channels. Not least, no additional
random component is needed to ensure individual secrecy of
message segments in the common satellite codeword since
each of the message segments is capable of fulfilling this
requirement. The generation of random variables from a
uniform distribution maximizes the difficulty of eavesdroppers
in tapping the information. However, perfect uniformity is
often difficult to achieve and slight information leakage is still
probable [11]. Hence, this reduction in the number of random
components helps lower the probability of information leakage
due to non-uniform distributions and results in a more secured
secrecy coding scheme.
The proposed simplified coding scheme has a simple con-
struction which allows us to identify an intuitive strategy
on applying secrecy techniques to error-correcting coding
schemes under individual secrecy constraints. Referring to
the left figure in Fig. 6, when secrecy is not required, the
best achievability scheme for broadcast channels in up-to-
date literature would be the superposition-Marton coding
scheme. In this scheme, the V n codeword carries common
messages which will be decoded by all receivers. Meanwhile,
the remaining V n1 and V
n
2 codewords will only carry private
messages intended to be decoded at the respective receivers.
Now, when individual secrecy sets in, we notice that secrecy
techniques can be integrated into the superposition-Marton
coding scheme without changing its structural framework.
As shown in the right figure in Fig. 6, the private message
codewords V n1 and V
n
2 can be secured with Wyner secrecy
coding [2] through the introduction of random components
D1 and D2. Meanwhile, the common message codeword V n
can also be protected from eavesdroppers by implementing
Carleial-Hellman secrecy coding [9] and have the message
segments M1c and M2c act as random components to protect
each another. It is also interesting to see that the availability
of receiver side information allows us to integrate the one-
time pad signal [1], which is a network layer solution, to
our physical layer coding scheme. By forming an additional
common message codeword Un which carries the one-time
pad signal, we are able to cover extreme cases in which
the channel to the eavesdropper is strictly stronger than the
channel to the legitimate receiver(s). Lastly, it is important to
note that although our discussion revolves around the case
of two-receiver broadcast channels, this secrecy technique
integration strategy should hold for broadcast channels with
more than two receivers if individual secrecy is required and
the superposition-Marton coding scheme is still applied.
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